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What About the Victims? 
Domestic Violence, Hearsay, and the 
Confrontation Clause in the Aftermath  
of Davis v. Washington 
 
STACEY GAUTHIER
∗ 
 
I.       INTRODUCTION 
Estimates state “approximately 1.5 million women and 
834,732 men are raped and/or physically assaulted by an 
intimate partner annually in the United States.”1   
In June 2006, in Davis v. Washington, the United States 
Supreme Court [hereinafter “U.S. Supreme Court” or “the 
Court”] held that statements made to law enforcement 
officials in the following circumstances are testimonial in 
nature and thus inadmissible if the victim is unavailable to 
testify at trial and was not previously subject to cross-
examination:2 “[W]hen the circumstances objectively indicate 
that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”3  
This holding resolved the ambiguity in the Court’s 2004 
Crawford v. Washington
4 decision as to what constitutes a 
testimonial statement.  Unfortunately for victims of domestic 
                                                 
∗ Stacey Gauthier, J.D., Southern New England School of Law 
(2007); B.S., University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth (2003).  The 
author would like to thank Professor Kevin Connelly for the direction and 
expertise he provided to her throughout the initial writing of the paper. 
1 Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, U.S. Dep’t of Just., NCJ 
181867, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence, 
at iii (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-
sum/181867.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). 
2 Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, 
237 (2006).  
3 Id.  
4 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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violence, in resolving that ambiguity, the Court created a 
hurdle to prosecuting this special type of case.  The extension 
of the Confrontation Clause in Davis is unwarranted, 
outweighed by the need for effective law enforcement, and 
cost prohibitive. 
This article analyzes the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation, admission of hearsay statements, and the effect 
of the Davis decision on the prosecution of domestic violence 
cases. Part II discusses the history of the Confrontation 
Clause. Part III discusses hearsay prior to Crawford.  Parts 
IV, V, and VI discuss the landmark cases Crawford v. 
Washington, Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,5 and Davis v. 
Washington, respectively, with regard to whether statements 
made to police are admissible when the declarant is not 
available to testify at trial.  The reasons why the Supreme 
Court’s extension of the Confrontation Clause is unwarranted 
are contained in Part VII.  The comparison of effective law 
enforcement and individual liberty is discussed in Part VIII 
with emphasis on constitutional rights and the functions of 
the police.  Part IX discusses the use of expert testimony in 
domestic violence cases.  Part X addresses the Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing Doctrine in response to the Court’s suggested 
use of this hearsay exception.  The article concludes in Part 
XI with a hypothetical case that could cause the Davis 
decision to change.  
 
II.       HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
 
The Confrontation Clause is found in the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to … be confronted with the witnesses against him”6  
It is applied to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.7  The right to confront one’s accusers can be 
                                                 
5 Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.  
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traced back to Roman law.8  However, the source of the Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation is English law.    
England used a system of common law as well as 
elements of the civil law system.9  Common law uses the 
adversarial system, where lawyers for opposing parties 
present the evidence and the legal arguments to a neutral 
decision-maker.10   Under this system, counter-argument and 
cross-examination are used to test the truthfulness of the 
opposing party’s case.11  Civil law uses the inquisitorial 
system, where an examining magistrate questions the accused 
and the witnesses and gathers other evidence.12  In this 
system, the examining magistrate investigates as well as 
adjudicates the case, and attorneys play a limited role.13  In 
the sixteenth century, two statutes were passed which 
required, in felony cases, justices of the peace to examine the 
parties and certify the results for the court.14  Since these 
statutes were passed during the reign of Queen Mary they 
were called the Marian Bail and Committal Statutes.15  In 
some instances the results of the examinations were used as 
evidence at trial.16  
One of the most infamous occurrences was the trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh for treason in 1603.17  At the time of 
Raleigh’s trial, a person accused of treason had no right to 
counsel and was not normally informed of the specific 
                                                 
8 Frank R. Herrmann, S.J. and Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the 
Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 
34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 483 (1994). 
9 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
10 Daniel L. Dreisbach, B.A., Ph.D., J.D, Criminal Procedure, 
MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, §§II, II B (2007), 
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761570809_1/Criminal_Procedure.
html. 
11 Id. at § II B. 
12 Id. at §§ II, II A. 
13 Id. at § II A. 
14
 Crawford 541 U.S. at 43-44. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 44. 
17 Herrmann, supra note 8, at 481-82. 
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charges until the beginning of the trial.18  Raleigh’s accuser, 
Lord Cobham, made accusations against Raleigh in a pretrial 
examination, which was then read in court during Raleigh’s 
trial, even though Cobham had subsequently recanted.19  
Raleigh denied the allegations and requested three times that 
Cobham be brought into court to voice his accusations to 
Raleigh’s face.20  The court refused and Raleigh was 
convicted and sentenced to death.21  In response, England 
developed a right of confrontation, as well as strict rules 
requiring that the witness actually be unavailable to testify 
before allowing examinations to be read.22  
The issue of the right to cross-examination arose in the 
1696 English case King v. Paine.23  In this case, the court 
ruled that although the witness was dead, his examination 
was inadmissible because the defendant did not have a prior 
chance to cross-examine him.24  In 1848, Parliament made 
the requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-examination 
explicit.25 
Examination practices used in the Colonies were also 
used controversially.26  Although some colonies, including 
Massachusetts, guaranteed a right of confrontation in their 
declaration of rights;27 the proposed Federal Constitution did 
                                                 
18 RALEIGH TREVELYAN, SIR WALTER RALEIGH 371 (Henry Holt 
2002).  There was also no presumption of innocence until proven guilty at 
this time either.  Id. at 370-71. 
19 Id. at 364, 374, 380. 
20 Id. at 380-82, 384.  Raleigh also argued that under common law 
there should be a trial with witnesses.  The court responded that it was to 
be done by examination.  Id. at 381. 
21 Id. at 386, 387. 
22 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-45 (2004). 
23 Id. at 45 (citing King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 
1696)). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 47. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 48 (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (McGraw-Hill 1971)).  See Virginia Declaration 
of Rights § 8; Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights §IX; Delaware 
Declaration of Rights § 14; Maryland Declaration of Rights § XIX; North 
Carolina Declaration of Rights § VII; Vermont Declaration of Rights Ch. 
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not.28  The lack of a right of confrontation clause was 
objected to at the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention as 
well as in a letter written by the Federal Farmer.29  As a 
result, the First Congress included a right to confrontation in 
what became the Sixth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution.30     
 
III.        HEARSAY PRIOR TO CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
 
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted.”31  The statement can be an 
oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct as long as it is 
intended to be an assertion.32 Hearsay statements are 
disfavored because they are not challenged through cross-
examination.33  On the other hand, hearsay exceptions exist 
due to the “strong necessity” for evidence that would 
normally be inadmissible.34 Hearsay statements have 
historically been allowed in evidence when the statements 
                                                                                                     
1 § X; Massachusetts Declaration of Rights § XII; New Hampshire Bill of 
Rights § XV, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra at 235, 265, 278, 282, 287, 
323, 342, 377. 
28 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48. 
29 Id. at 48-49.  Mr. Holmes stated to the President at the 
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, “the mode of trial is altogether 
indetermined; … whether the criminal… is to be allowed to meet his 
accuser face to face; whether he is to be allowed to confront the 
witnesses, and have the advantage of cross-examination, we are not yet 
told.”  Reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 690.  In a letter written 
by The Federal Farmer on October 12, 1787, the writer states that 
“[n]othing can be more essential than the cross examining witnesses, and 
generally before the triers of the facts in question.  The common people 
can establish facts with much more ease with oral than written evidence.”  
Reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note27, at 473.      
30 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48-49. 
31 FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
32 FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
33 HON. PAUL J. LIACOS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF MASS. EVIDENCE 464 
(Aspen 7th ed. 1999). 
34 Id. at 477. 
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were made under circumstances in which reliability was 
ensured, and when no better evidence was available.35 
Before the Court’s decision in Crawford, hearsay 
statements were divided into four categories: “(1) prior 
statements by witnesses who testify in the present proceeding 
under oath and are subject to cross-examination concerning 
their prior statement; (2) former testimony of presently 
unavailable witnesses; (3) other hearsay falling within a 
‘firmly rooted’ exception; and (4) hearsay not falling within a 
‘firmly rooted’ exception.”36  The Crawford decision does 
not affect the first two categories of hearsay statements, but it 
greatly changes the treatment of statements in the last two.37  
Prior to Crawford, a statement made by an unavailable 
declarant was admissible when the statement contained 
“adequate ‘indicia of reliability’” [hereinafter the “Roberts 
Test”].38  To meet the Roberts Test, the Court determined that 
the evidence must fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay 
exception” or contain “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness” (non-firmly rooted exception).39    
According to the Court, when hearsay falls within a 
“firmly rooted exception,” the Confrontation Clause is likely 
satisfied.40 Many exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
                                                 
35 Id. at 464. 
36 OLIN GUY WELLBORN III, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RULES 
OF EVIDENCE 257 (Thompson/West 2005).  
37 Id. at 257-58. 
38 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (In Roberts, the issue was 
whether the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated when the trial 
court admitted the transcript of a witness’s testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, when the witness did not testify at the defendant’s trial.  Id. at 58.  
The Court held that normally when a declarant does not testify at trial 
there must be a showing that the declarant is actually unavailable.  Id. at 
66.  In this case, the statement must contain “indicia of reliability.” Id.  
The Court explained that when a hearsay statement falls within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception reliability can be inferred.  Id.  If the hearsay 
statement does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception the 
statement must contain “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” or 
it must be excluded.  Id.  The Roberts “indicia of reliability” test was used 
prior to the Court’s decision in Crawford.).  
39 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
40 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,347 (1992). 
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qualify as firmly rooted exceptions.41  The Court specifically 
identified excited utterances, statements made for medical 
treatment, and statements made by co-conspirators as 
qualifying exceptions.42  The Court reasoned that certain 
‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exceptions have such solid 
foundations that almost any statements that fall within them 
would comply with the Constitutional requirements.43  For 
example, the spontaneous utterance exception, which has 
existed for the last two centuries, is currently recognized by 
four-fifths of the states, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.44  
As late as 1992, the Court stated in White v. Illinois, “a 
statement that qualifies for admission under a ‘firmly rooted’ 
hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing 
can be expected to add little to its reliability.”45 
For statements that do not fall within a “firmly rooted” 
hearsay exception, the Supreme Court held that it would only 
satisfy the Confrontation Clause if the statement showed 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”46  
“Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” must be based 
on the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the making 
of the statement, not on the other evidence that corroborates 
it.47  For example, in Idaho v. Wright, the U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Idaho’s refusal to admit 
statements regarding sexual abuse made by a three-year-old 
girl to a doctor because the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the doctor’s questioning was unreliable (he did 
not videotape the interview and he used leading questions).  
However, the victim’s statements were corroborated by 
physical evidence and the testimony of the victim’s older 
sister.48  In the non-firmly rooted exception it is up to the 
                                                 
41 E.g., FED. R. EVID 801(d)(2); FED R. EVID. 803; FED. R. EVID. 804. 
42 White, 502 U.S. at 347. 
43 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
44 White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8. 
45 Id. at 357. 
46 Roberts, 488 U.S. at 66. 
47 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990). 
48 Id. at 809, 812-813. 
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judge to decide whether a statement is reliable, which factors 
to consider, and how much weight to give them.49   
When the Court decided Crawford, in March of 2004, 
merely 12 years after White, and with seven of the same 
Justices, it had a very different idea about what types of 
hearsay statements would satisfy the Confrontation Clause.  
 
IV.         CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
 
In the 2004 landmark case, Crawford v. Washington, the 
U.S. Supreme Court overruled the decades-old “indicia of 
reliability” test from Ohio v. Roberts, greatly limiting the 
types of out-of-court statements admissible in evidence.   
In Crawford, the Court held the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment prohibits out-of-court statements, 
which are testimonial in nature, to be allowed into evidence 
unless the declarant is unavailable and the opponent had a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination.50  However, the 
Court declined to give a complete definition of the word 
testimonial except to say that it included “at a minimum … 
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 
or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”51  The Court 
also failed to articulate what it meant by “police 
interrogation.”52 
The vague definitions of testimonial and “police 
interrogation” caused confusion among state and federal 
courts all over the country in trying to interpret what the 
Court meant.53  Lower courts were split on what types of 
hearsay evidence were admissible if the declarant was 
unavailable to testify.  For example, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that statements made 
during a 911 call are testimonial because they are made to the 
                                                 
49 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004). 
50 Id. at 68-69. 
51 Id.. at 68. 
52 Id. at 68. 
53 Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 562, 574-75 (Mass. 
2005). 
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police.54  On the other hand, other courts found 911 calls not 
testimonial when the caller was “focused on obtaining 
urgently needed assistance, not contemplating the statement’s 
potential use at trial.”55 
 
A.  Facts  
  
Crawford, the defendant, was arrested for stabbing the 
victim, Kenneth Lee, in Lee’s apartment on August 5, 1999.56  
The police gave both Crawford and his wife Sylvia their 
Miranda
57 warnings and proceeded to interrogate them.58  
Eventually, Crawford confessed that he and his wife had gone 
to the victim’s apartment because the victim allegedly tried to 
rape Sylvia and Crawford was mad.59  When they found the 
victim, a fight broke out.  The victim was stabbed and 
Crawford’s hand cut.60  
Crawford and Sylvia gave differing stories as to what 
happened during the fight.  Crawford claimed he saw the 
victim reaching for something and got cut when he grabbed 
for it.61  Sylvia claimed the victim went to hit Crawford and 
that is when Crawford stabbed him; she did not see anything 
in the victim’s hands.62 
Crawford was charged with assault and attempted 
murder; he claimed self-defense at trial.63  Due to the marital 
                                                 
54 Id. at 571 (citing United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d, 895, 933, 904 
(6th Cir. 2005)). 
55 Id. (citing Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 830 n. 22 (9th Cir. 
2004); People v. Corella,  18 Cal.Rptr.3d 770, 776 (2004); State v. 
Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211 (Me. 2004); People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 
875, 879 (N.Y. Crim.Ct. 2004); State v. Newell, Ohio Ct.App. No. 2004 
CA 00264, 2005 WL 1364937 (May 31, 2005)). 
56 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
57 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
58 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 38-39. 
62 Id. at 39-40. 
63 Id. at 40. 
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privilege, Sylvia did not testify.64  Accordingly, under the 
Statement Against Penal Interest hearsay exception, the 
prosecution tried to introduce Sylvia’s tape-recorded 
statements to police to show that Crawford did not act in self-
defense.65  
Crawford argued that admitting the statements would 
violate his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.66  The 
trial court, using the Roberts test, admitted the statements 
finding that they contained “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”67  The trial court reasoned that the 
statements were trustworthy because Sylvia was an 
eyewitness, she described the events to a “neutral” police 
officer, and she was not shifting the blame but rather 
corroborating Crawford’s story.68  The prosecution played the 
tape at trial and Crawford was convicted.69  
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the decision, 
and the Washington Supreme Court reinstated the 
conviction.70  The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to address the issue of whether the use of Sylvia’s 
out-of-court statement violated Crawford’s right to 
confrontation.71   
 
B. Holding / Rationale 
 
The Court determined that there are two “inferences” 
about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.72  The first 
inference is that the main evil which the Confrontation 
Clause was designed to protect against was the civil-law 
criminal procedure method and especially the use of ex parte 
communications.73  From this, the Court found that the 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 40-41. 
70 Id. at 41-42. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 50. 
73 Id. at  50. 
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Confrontation Clause applies to witnesses who bear 
testimony.74  The court referred to a dictionary from the year 
1828 finding the word “testimony” defined as “[a] solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.”75  The Court did not 
specifically define the word testimonial, but gave the 
following examples: 
 
[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that 
the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or 
similar pretrial statements that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorally …, extrajudicial statements … 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions…[,] [statements that 
were made under circumstances which would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at 
a later trial].76 
 
According to the Court, these examples all have a 
“common nucleus,” meaning, that the above are all formal 
statements where the declarant is bearing testimony77 
The Court also found police interrogations testimonial 
because they resemble the examinations by justices of the 
peace in England.78  In support of this finding, the Court 
stated that England did not have a police force until the 
nineteenth century and before that government officers 
performed investigations, thus creating the same risk with 
police officers as was created with other government figures 
                                                 
74 Id. at 51. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 51-52. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
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in pre-nineteenth century England.79  However, the Court 
refused to define “interrogation,” saying only that it should be 
used in its “colloquial” sense.80 
The second inference of the Confrontation Clause is that 
the Framers allowed a testimonial statement of a witness 
unavailable to testify only if the defendant had a previous 
chance to cross-examine the witness.81  The Court determined 
that the Sixth Amendment incorporated the common-law 
right of confrontation.82  In Mattox v. United States, an 1895 
case, the Court held prior testimony, from a trial or a 
preliminary hearing, is inadmissible if the defendant does not 
have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.83  
Historically, the Court excluded testimony where the 
prosecution failed to show the witness was actually 
unavailable.84  The hearsay exceptions as they existed at the 
time of the framing of the Constitution were for non-
testimonial statements, such as business records.85  However, 
there was an exception for dying declarations, whether 
testimonial or not.86 
The Court rejected the Roberts Test because it claimed 
that the Roberts Test differed from the above principles.  
First, the Court found the Roberts Test to be too broad 
because it applies the same analysis, regardless of whether 
the statements are ex parte testimonial.  Second, the Court 
found it was too narrow because it allows statements in 
evidence that are ex parte testimonial on only a finding of 
reliability.87 The Court found the Roberts Test to be 
                                                 
79 Id. at 53. 
80 Id. at 68, 53 n.4 (comparing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 
300-301 (1980)).  
81 Id. at 54-55. 
82 Id. at 54. 
83 Id. at 57 (discussing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 
(1895)). 
84 Id. (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1968), and Motes 
v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 470-71 (1900)). 
85 Id. at 56. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 60. 
2007 What About the Victims?   313 
 
  
unpredictable and that it admitted statements the 
Confrontation Clause was designed to keep out.88 
The Court held that when non-testimonial hearsay is at 
issue, state evidence law should apply; but where testimonial 
evidence is at issue, the Confrontation Clause and common 
law require that the witness be unavailable and that the 
defendant have a prior opportunity for cross-examination.89 
 
C. Concurring Opinion 
  
In Crawford, there was no dissenting opinion; however, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justice O’Connor) 
concurred in the judgment, disagreeing only with the Court’s 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.90  
Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that, at common law, 
un-sworn testimonial statements were not treated any 
differently from non-testimonial statements.91  There was no 
information that un-sworn testimonial statements were 
excluded if they fell within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception.92  The right to cross-examination was to promote 
the reliability of evidence against the accused in criminal 
trials.93  Rehnquist noted that under some circumstances, out-
of-court statements are reliable by virtue of the conditions 
under which they were made;94 such as statements made by 
co-conspirators, excited utterances, statements made for 
medical treatments, and dying declarations.95  Over one 
hundred years ago, in Mattox, the Court declared “[t]he law 
in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be 
wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be 
preserved to the accused.”96 
                                                 
88 Id. at 63. 
89 Id. at 68. 
90 Id. at 69. 
91 Id. at 71. 
92 Id. at 73. 
93 Id. at 74.  
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 75 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 
(1895)). 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that the Court should 
define testimonial at the time of the Crawford decision.97  His 
position was that the many state and federal prosecutors 
should not be “left in the dark” as to what types of statements 
are testimonial.98 
 
V.       COMMONWEALTH V. GONSALVES 
 
Guided by the decision in Crawford, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts [hereinafter “SJC”] created its own 
landmark ruling in the 2005 case Commonwealth v. 
Gonsalves.99 The SJC’s holding in this case is more 
conservative than the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in 
Crawford and contrary in direction to that of most other 
states. 
 
A. Facts 
  
On March 16, 2003, the victim and Gonsalves, the 
victim’s boyfriend, were in the victim’s bedroom.100  The 
victim’s mother was in her own bedroom located two doors 
down.101  The mother overheard an argument between the 
victim and Gonsalves, which included “yelling, screaming, 
and crying.”102  When the mother went to see what was going 
on she found the victim crying on her bed and Gonsalves 
gone.103  The victim told her mother that she and Gonsalves 
had an argument during which Gonsalves grabbed her shirt so 
tight she could not breathe and he then hit her.104 
Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and stated that they 
received a call about a “domestic disturbance.”105  The victim 
and her mother did not make the call to the police.106  
                                                 
97 Id. at 75-76. 
98 Id. 
99 Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Mass. 2005). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id.  
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When the police arrived, the victim was “crying and 
hysterical, ranting, loud, hyperventilating and pacing around 
the room.”107  She had no obvious injuries.108  One of the 
officers asked the victim what happened and she responded 
that her boyfriend grabbed her, choked her, and hit her head 
on the floor.109  She named Gonsalves as her boyfriend and 
gave the police a description of him.110  An ambulance 
arrived and took the victim to the hospital.111  Gonsalves was 
eventually charged with both ‘assault and battery’ and 
‘assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.’112 
The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine on 
December 16, 2003, to allow into evidence the victim’s out-
of-court statements to her mother and the police under the 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.113  At this 
point, the victim was available to testify.114  However, she 
was not called to testify and therefore not cross-examined.115  
After hearing testimony from the mother and one of the 
police officers, the trial court allowed the motion to admit the 
hearsay statements.116   
In response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Crawford, Gonsalves filed a motion for reconsideration on 
March 31, 2004.117  This time, the victim invoked her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, thus 
becoming unavailable to testify.118  The trial court reversed 
its previous ruling, based on the decision in Crawford, 
finding that the statements were made in response to police 
                                                                                                     
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 552-53. 
111 Id. at 553. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 561. 
116 Id. at 553. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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interrogation and were testimonial in nature.119  The trial 
court refused to allow the statements in evidence.120  The 
Commonwealth petitioned the SJC on appeal.121 
 
B. Holding / Rationale 
  
In its decision, the SJC held that statements made in 
response to questioning by law enforcement agents are per se 
testimonial, except when the questioning is meant to secure a 
volatile scene or to establish the need for and to  provide 
medical care.122  It also held that out-of-court statements 
which are not per se testimonial should be tested to make 
sure they are not testimonial in fact by “evaluating whether a 
reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate 
his statement being used against the accused in investigating 
and prosecuting a crime.”123  In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not clearly define what types of statements are 
testimonial.124 The Supreme Court did state that testimonial  
statements are made during a police interrogation.  The SJC 
had to define “police interrogation” to determine whether the 
statements made by the victim to the officers were 
testimonial.125  The SJC defined the levels of  “police 
interrogation” as follows: 
 
(1) custodial interrogation -“[p]olice 
questioning of a detained person about the 
crime that he or she is suspected of having 
committed”; (2) noncustodial interrogation-
“[p]olice questioning of a suspect who has not 
been detained and can leave at will”; and (3) 
investigatory interrogation-“[r]outine, non-
                                                 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 555-56. 
123 Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 
(6th Cir. 2004)).  
124 Id. at 557. 
125 Id.  
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accusatory questioning by the police of a 
person who is not in custody.”
126
 
 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court stated that it used the term 
interrogation in its “colloquial” sense,127 the SJC ruled that 
all questioning by any type of law enforcement agent in the 
investigation or prosecution of a crime is interrogation.128 
The SJC specifically excluded questioning to secure a 
volatile situation or to establish the need for medical care; the 
Court states that in those instances the police are providing a 
community care-taking function, not investigation of a 
crime.129  The SJC further stated that the community care-
taking function takes effect when “there is an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that the safety of an individual 
or the public is jeopardized.”130  Since statements made in 
these circumstances are not considered police interrogation, 
they are not testimonial per se and may be admitted upon 
determination that they are not testimonial in fact.131 
The SJC determined that the police officer’s questioning 
of the victim was not necessary to control a volatile situation 
or to determine whether medical help was needed.  Therefore, 
the statements the victim made to the police officers were per 
se testimonial.  Her statements were not admissible because 
she continued to be unavailable to testify and she was not 
previously subject to cross-examination at a prior hearing.132 
The statements the victim made to her mother were not 
per se testimonial because the mother is a private citizen, not 
an agent of the police.133  Using the test to determine whether 
the statements were testimonial in fact, the SJC determined 
that a reasonable person, in the victim’s position, would not 
                                                 
126 Id. at 555 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 838 (8th ed.2004)) 
(emphasis added). 
127 Id.  
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 556. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 557. 
132 Id. at 561. 
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318          Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law        Vol. 2 
 
  
anticipate the use of her statements in prosecuting the 
defendant.134 
The SJC also analyzed other states’ interpretation of 
“testimonial.”  An Illinois court defined “testimonial” as 
“whether the statement is made or procured to prove or 
establish facts in judicial proceedings.”135  The Sixth Circuit 
interpreted “testimonial” as, “whether a reasonable person in 
the declarant’s position would anticipate his statement being 
used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting a 
crime.”136  These courts construed “testimonial” in much the 
same way as the SJC did.  
 
C. Concurring Opinion 
 
Justice Sosman’s concurring opinion states that “police 
interrogation” should not include initial questioning by police 
to determine why the police were called.137  According to 
Justice Sosman, when police initially arrive at the scene, 
“they do not know whether they will be told about a crime, an 
accident, a misunderstanding, or a false alarm; nor do they 
know whether anyone will report that there is some injury or 
imminent danger that needs their attention.”138  Justice 
Sosman claims, when police arrive at the scene, they are 
performing both the community-caretaking function and the 
investigative function at the same time, and with the same 
questions.139  Accordingly, Justice Sosman noted that the 
dictionary defined “interrogation” as “question[ing] typically 
with formality, command, and thoroughness for full 
                                                 
134 Id. at 562. 
135 Id. at 557 (citing People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82 (Ill.App.Ct. 
2005)). 
136 Id. at 558 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th 
Cir. 2004)). 
137 Id. at 562 (Sosman, J., concurring in the result) (Justice Sosman 
concurred in the majority’s decision to remand the case in light of 
Crawford, but disagreed with the majority’s analysis of Crawford.  Id. at 
575).  
138 Id. at 564. 
139 Id. at 565. 
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information and circumstantial detail.”140  She also noted that 
the dictionary defined “interrogate” as “to question formally 
and systematically.”141  In Justice Sosman’s view, an 
interrogation does not begin until the police are actually 
investigating a crime and preparing for trial, at which point 
the questioning takes on an “aura of formality.”142  She also 
opines that police questioning in these circumstances is not 
the kind of evil the Confrontation Clause was designed to 
protect against.143 
Justice Sosman looked to decisions made in other states.  
The Alaska Court of Appeals held that “excited responses to 
brief on-the-scene questioning by police officers,” are not 
testimonial as delineated in Crawford.144  The Alaska court 
also claimed that this position is “the emerging majority 
view” of initial police questioning upon arrival at the 
scene.145 The Federal District Court in Massachusetts stated 
in dicta that it was “doubtful” Crawford included 
spontaneous utterances.146  A Texas court found that, “most 
of the post-Crawford cases reviewing this issue have held 
that initial police-victim interaction at the scene of an 
                                                 
140 Id at 564 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 
1182 (1993)).  
141 Id. (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW (1996)). 
142 Id.  
143 Id. at 566. 
144 Id. at 567 (quoting Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 356 (Alaska  
Ct. App. 2005)) (The issue in Anderson was “whether [the victim’s] 
response to the [police] officer’s question, ‘What happened?’, qualifies as 
‘testimonial’ hearsay under Crawford.”  Anderson, at 351.  The Alaska 
Appeals Court held that it did not, because under the facts of the case, the 
victim’s response was an excited utterance and therefore was not made 
“under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to 
reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial.”  Id. at 354 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 
(2004))). 
145 Gonsalves, at 567 (citing Anderson, at 356). 
146 Id. at 572 (citing United States v. Brown, 322 F.Supp.2d 101, 105 
n. 4 (D. Mass, 2004)) (In Brown, the police relied on the statement, “I am 
not going to jail for [the defendant] again” as a basis for probable cause to 
arrest the defendant.  The judge determined that the statement could be 
credited as reliable either as an excited utterance or as a declaration 
against penal interest.  Brown, at 105). 
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incident is not an interrogation….”147  These courts agree 
with Justice Sosman’s view that initial police questioning at 
the scene of the crime is not police interrogation.   
Justice Sosman predicts there will be a negative effect on 
an “overly expansive” definition of police interrogation in 
prosecuting certain crimes, particularly gang-related and 
domestic violence crimes.148  Also she suggests that a 
“narrow” definition will violate a defendant’s right to 
confrontation.149  Per the opinion, it is evident that Justice 
Sosman believes the SJC should choose a definition that falls 
between “overly expansive” and “narrow.”150  
 
VI.        DAVIS V. WASHINGTON / HAMMON V. INDIANA 
 
In June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a pair of 
cases collectively referred to as “Davis.” The Court answered 
the questions left open by Crawford.  Notably, the Court 
ruled on the issues of confrontation and hearsay. 
 
A. Facts 
  
In Davis v. Washington, the victim called 911 but the 
phone disconnected when the operator answered.151  The 
operator called back and when the victim answered, the 
operator asked her what was going on.  The victim replied 
                                                 
147 Gonsalves, at 567 (citing Key v. State, 173 S.W.3d 72, 75 
(Tex.Ct.App. 2005)) (In Key, the Texas Appeals Court opined that the 
police officer “was responding to a call and was involved in the 
preliminary task of securing and assessing the scene.”  He was “not 
producing evidence in anticipation of a potential criminal prosecution 
when he encountered [the victim].  The “unstructured interaction” 
between the police officer and the victim was not an  “interrogation” in 
the sense used in Crawford.  In addition, the victim had just suffered 
physical abuse and had no time to think about it.  Therefore, the statement 
was most likely  truthful, and not made in contemplation of use in a future 
trial.  Key, at 76). 
148 Gonsalves, at 574. 
149 Id.  
150 Id. 
151 Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2270, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, 
234 (2006).  
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that “[h]e’s here jumping on me again.”152  While Davis was 
still in the house the operator ascertained his full name.153  
Davis then ran out of the house and at that point the operator 
questioned the victim about the events leading up to the 
attack.154  The police arrived shortly after the call to 911 and 
found the victim shaken, with “fresh injuries on her forearm 
and her face.”155 
Davis was charged with felony violation of a no-contact 
order.  The only witnesses that testified were the police 
officers who responded to the emergency 911 call.156  The 
victim was available to testify but did not.157  The court 
admitted the tape-recorded emergency call over Davis’s 
objection and he was convicted.158  The Washington Court of 
Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction.159   
In Hammon v. Indiana, the police responded to a 
“domestic disturbance” call at the home of Hammon and his 
wife, the victim.160   The victim was found to be “somewhat 
frightened” on the front porch.161  She told them nothing was 
wrong but allowed them to enter the house where they 
noticed that a heating unit in the living room was broken, 
with flames coming out and glass on the floor.162  Hammon 
told the police that he and his wife had an argument, that 
everything was all right now, and that it had not become 
physical.163 
One of the officers took the victim into another room to 
hear her side of the story and Hammon got mad when the 
                                                 
152 Id. at 2271, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 234. 
153 Id.  
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 2271, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 235. 
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 Id.  
159 Id.  
160 Id. at 2272, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 235   
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officer would not let him into the room.164  After hearing the 
victim’s side, the officer had her fill out a battery affidavit.  
In the affidavit the victim wrote that Hammon broke the 
heater, pushed her down into the broken glass, hit her, and 
attacked her daughter.165 
Hammon was charged with domestic battery and 
probation violation.166  The victim was subpoenaed but failed 
to appear at trial.167  The prosecution called the officer who 
spoke to the victim and asked him to testify as to what the 
victim told him and to authenticate the affidavit.168  Hammon 
objected, but the trial court admitted the victim’s statement 
under the spontaneous utterance exception and the affidavit 
under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay 
rule.169  Hammon was found guilty and convicted.  The 
Indiana Court of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court 
affirmed the conviction.170  
 
B. Holding / Rationale 
  
The U.S. Supreme Court raised the concern that these 
cases are not as clear as Crawford and that they would have 
to more clearly define what types of police interrogations 
generate testimonial statements.171  The Court determined 
that a statement is testimonial when there is no ongoing 
emergency and the main purpose of the interrogation is to 
prove past criminal events.  On the other hand, the Court 
determined that a statement is not testimonial when the main 
purpose of the interrogation is to take care of an ongoing 
emergency.  Whether a statement is testimonial or not is an 
objective test.172   
                                                 
164 Id.  
165 Id. at 2272, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 235-36. 
166 Id. at 2272, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 236. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 2272-2273, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 236, 
169 Id. at 2272, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 236. 
170 Id. at 2273, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 236. 
171 Id. at 2273, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 236-37. 
172 Id. at 2273-2274, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237. 
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When the victim in the Davis case called 911 she was 
describing “events as they were actually happening, rather 
than ‘des[cribing] past events.’”173  The Court reasoned that 
the 911 emergency call was not testimonial until Davis left 
the house (when the emergency ended).  Since the only issue 
before the Court was whether the early statements made to 
the 911 operator were testimonial, the Court ruled that they 
were not and upheld Davis’s conviction.174 
In Hammon, unlike in Davis, the court found that the 
police arrived after the emergency.175  Therefore, the officer 
who took the victim’s statement was trying to find out what 
had already occurred.176  The Court determined that the 
victim’s statement was formal, like that given in Crawford, 
because the officer took her into a separate room, would not 
let Hammon in, and questioned her on how the events 
evolved.177 They found the statements “inherently 
testimonial.”178  The Court did recognize that many times in 
emergencies an initial police questioning will not produce 
testimonial results. However, that was not the case in 
Hammon.179 
The Court acknowledged the difficulty in prosecuting 
domestic violence crimes suggesting that the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine would suffice.180  In this doctrine 
someone who ensures the unavailability of a witness forfeits 
his or her right to confrontation.181  The government has to 
prove the wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.182  
 
 
 
                                                 
173 Id. at 2276, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 240 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 
U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion)). 
174 Id. at 2277-78, 2280, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 241, 244. 
175 Id. at 2278, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 242 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 2279, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 243. 
180 Id. at 2279-80, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 243-44. 
181 Id. at 2280, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 244 
182 Id.  See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
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VII. THE EXTENSION OF THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE IS UNWARRANTED 
  
In 1895, in Mattox v. United States, the Supreme Court 
opined that it was “bound to interpret the Constitution in the 
light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as 
reaching out for new guaranties of the rights of the 
citizens.”183 The Court’s decision in Davis, however, 
guarantees new rights to criminal defendants.   
“The exception for [excited utterances] is at least two 
centuries old … and may date back to the late seventeenth 
century.”184  The Sixth Amendment was adopted in 1791.185   
Thus, the excited utterance exception existed at the time of 
the adoption of the Sixth Amendment.  If the Framers of the 
Constitution had intended for the Confrontation Clause to 
supplant the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, 
they would have made that clear when they drafted the Sixth 
Amendment.  The Court in Mattox recognized the “dying 
declaration” exception based on reliability, not on whether it 
was testimonial. “[T]he sense of impending death is 
presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to 
enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the 
obligation of an oath.”186  The Court stated that reliability has 
been the measure of whether a hearsay statement is 
admissible for over 200 years and there is no reason for that 
to change now.187  
According to the Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence, 
one of the reasons for the creation of hearsay exceptions is 
the “necessity for the evidence the rule would otherwise 
exclude.”188  To exclude victims’ statements to police in 
domestic violence cases could potentially give defendants a 
                                                 
183 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). 
184 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 (1992).  
185 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
186 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244. 
187 Id. 
188 LIACOS, supra note 33, at 477 (emphasis added). 
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“get-out-of-jail-free card.”189  There is no reason to give 
defendants a get-out-of-jail-free card because the types of 
statements now inadmissible under Davis are not the same 
types of ex parte statements the Confrontation Clause was 
designed to protect.  No longer does a law enforcement agent 
read a statement into the record, and the defendant get 
convicted based on that statement alone.  Law enforcement 
agents also testify about “the complainant’s physical 
appearance, her screams, her medical records, and 
photographs … and the fact that no one else was in a position 
to have inflicted [the victim’s] injuries.”190  In addition, when 
a hearsay statement is admitted into evidence the declarant’s 
credibility may be attacked as if the declarant was on the 
stand testifying.191  Fact finders have more evidence to 
consider in the twenty-first century than they did in the 
sixteenth or seventeenth century.  Trials today are not limited 
to just a deposition or affidavit that is read into the record.  
The United States uses the adversarial system, where counter-
argument and cross-examination are used to ferret out the 
truth.  Hearsay exceptions were created out of necessity.  It is 
erroneous for the Court to arbitrarily exclude evidence which 
hearsay exceptions were designed to allow in evidence.   
In addition, it appears from the Davis decision that 
emergency medical technicians [hereinafter “EMTs”] who 
arrive at the scene would not be barred from testifying to 
statements made by the victim since EMTs are not law 
enforcement agents.  In other words, the same hearsay 
statements that would not be admissible post-Davis under the 
excited utterance or present sense impression exception for 
police officer testimony would be admissible under the 
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment exception192 when an EMT testifies.  Hearsay is 
hearsay regardless of what exception allows it into evidence.  
The job of EMTs is to save lives.  It is detrimental to public 
                                                 
189 Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006) (discussing the 
exclusionary rule). 
190 Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 559 (Mass. 2005). 
191 FED. R. EVID. 806. 
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health to take an EMT away from his or her job to testify at 
court to a statement that the responding police officer could 
just as easily testify to and is within the police officer’s 
duties. 
It is unlikely that the Court, in 2006, has a better idea of 
what the Framers intended than it did in 1895.  Absent new 
findings regarding the intent of the Framers of the Sixth 
Amendment, the extension of the Confrontation Clause in 
Davis and Crawford is unwarranted because exceptions to the 
hearsay rule have existed for centuries and the civil law 
method of criminal procedure is not used in the United States.            
 
VIII. EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT VERSUS 
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY 
 
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to face 
their accusers.193 However, this right must be balanced 
against the need for effective law enforcement.  States have a 
compelling interest in protecting victims of domestic 
violence.  The most effective way to prosecute this type of 
crime, in cases where the victim recants or refuses to testify, 
is to use the excited utterance hearsay exception which allows 
the responding police officers to testify as to the victim’s 
statements.  In reaching its decision in Davis, the Supreme 
Court unnecessarily tipped the scale in favor of the criminal 
defendant.  
 
A. Constitutional Rights 
  
There are numerous circumstances where the U.S. 
Supreme Court has refused to unnecessarily extend 
constitutional rights.  For example, the Fourth Amendment 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures; yet, there 
are exceptions to the warrant requirement, which the Court 
has consistently upheld.  These exceptions include: plain 
view, exigent circumstances, searches incident to arrest, and 
consent searches.  Additionally, in Michigan Dep’t of State 
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Police v. Sitz, the Court rejected the argument that sobriety 
checkpoints are unreasonable seizures, stating the interest in 
eliminating drunk drivers outweighs minimal invasion of 
drivers’ privacy interests.194  In Terry v. Ohio, a police officer 
stopped the defendants and patted them down before he had 
probable cause to arrest them.195  The Court rejected the 
unreasonable search and seizure argument pointing to the 
interest of “crime prevention and detection,”196 and stating “it 
is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police 
officer may in appropriate manner approach a person for 
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even 
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”197  The 
Court held in New York v. Quarles that there is a “public 
safety” exception to the Sixth Amendment Miranda 
warnings.198  
In Quarles, the defendant was arrested in a grocery store 
and had hidden a gun somewhere inside the store.199  The 
Court went on to state that “the need for answers to questions 
in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs 
the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.”200  Over 
one hundred years ago, the Court acknowledged that 
constitutional rights, “however beneficent in their operation 
and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to 
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the 
case.”201  
 The Court’s decision in Davis fails to recognize the 
safety of victims of domestic violence, the states’ interest in 
protecting those victims, and the interest of crime prevention. 
This allows the abuser to go free from incarceration, where 
the abuser may continue to hurt the victim and any children 
                                                 
194 Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
195 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1968). 
196 Id. at 22. 
197 Id. 
198 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984). 
199 Id. at 651-52. 
200 Id. at 657. 
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who are forced to witness the abuse.  If an abuser goes free, 
this will put other unsuspecting people in danger as well.  
Further, if the abuser is freed, there is no incentive for him or 
her to get help in order to break the cycle of abuse. If the state 
is unable to successfully prosecute the abuser, why should the 
abuser attempt to seek help?  Permitting the abuser to go free 
may also limit the victims from seeking help since, generally 
speaking, the only time the victim is truly free from the 
abuser is when the abuser is incarcerated.  States have a 
compelling interest to keep domestic abusers off the streets.   
In Hudson v. Michigan, decided merely days before 
Davis, the Court refused to suppress evidence found during a 
search where the police violated the knock and announce 
rule.202  It opined that:  
 
Suppression of evidence, however, has always 
been our last resort, not our first impulse.  The 
exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social 
costs,’ … which sometimes include setting the 
guilty free and the dangerous at large.  We 
have therefore been ‘cautious against 
expanding’ it, … and have repeatedly 
emphasized that the rule’s ‘costly toll’ upon 
truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives 
presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] 
application.203 
 
The Court’s decision in Davis is contrary to its decision in 
Hudson. Failing to allow the police to testify as to the 
statements made by the victim in domestic violence cases 
effectively “suppresses” the evidence against the defendant 
and quite possibly allows a criminal to go free.  In Davis, the 
Court failed to weigh the “substantial social costs”204 of not 
allowing hearsay evidence under the excited utterance 
                                                 
202 Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct 2159, 2163 (2006). 
203 Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986), Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and 
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364-365 (1998).  
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exception, thus potentially allowing an abuser to go free 
against the “truth-seeking and law enforcement 
objectives.”205 
One solution to these injustices is to create an “exigency” 
or “public safety” exception to the Confrontation Clause in 
domestic violence cases.  The Court recognized in Hudson 
that the Fourth Amendment knock and announce requirement 
“is not necessary … if there is ‘reason to believe that 
evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were 
given….’”206 Similarly, in domestic violence cases it is 
possible that the witness will recant or disappear before the 
case goes to trial, “destroying” vital evidence.  For example, 
when a victim of domestic violence knows in advance that 
her or his testimony is needed at trial, the victim has time to 
recant or refuse to testify.  Prosecutors are aware of this, and 
have reason to believe that there is a likelihood that they will 
lose their witness.  If they lose their witness, and the 
responding police officer is not allowed to testify to the 
statements the victim made at the scene, it is likely the 
defendant will not be able to be prosecuted.  That would be 
an exigent circumstance and would require an immediate 
solution.  The solution would be an exception to the Sixth 
Amendment in the one limited circumstance of domestic 
violence since the evidence (the victim’s testimony) would 
likely be destroyed if advance notice were given (by refusal 
to testify or recanting).  The exception could also be called a 
public safety exception since protecting victims, children, or 
the unsuspecting public from an abuser could be considered 
public safety.  This solution is compatible with the Court’s 
decision in Hudson. 
 
B. Functions of the Police 
  
With regard to the role of police officers, there is no 
difference between the “investigatory function” and the 
“community caretaking” function of the police.  Both 
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functions fall within the general category of law enforcement.  
As Justice Sosman pointed out in her concurring opinion in 
Gonsalves, when the police respond to an emergency 911 call 
they do not know what to expect.207  They do not know 
whether anyone needs medical assistance or whether there is 
a dangerous situation they will need to control.  The majority 
points out in Gonsalves that the defendant had left the scene 
when the police arrived and concluded that there was no 
ongoing emergency.208  However, the SJC failed to address 
the fact that Gonsalves could have returned after the police 
left.  In addition, nothing in the facts, as given in the SJC’s 
decision, indicates that the police knew Gonsalves was gone 
when they arrived.  For all the police knew, Gonsalves could 
have been hiding in another room.  The fact that the victim 
had no visible marks on her did not mean that she was not 
injured or in need of medical care.  In Commonwealth v. 
Foley, decided on the same day as Gonsalves, the SJC 
allowed statements by a child that the defendant was hiding 
in another room and statements made by the victim about her 
need for medical care because she had marks on her.209  If 
Gonsalves was hiding in the bathroom and the victim had a 
scratch on her, the case would likely have been decided 
differently because it would essentially be the same case as 
Foley.    
Justice Thomas notes, in his concurring opinion in Davis, 
that the attack in Hammon on the victim was not actually 
happening when she was describing it to the 911 operator.210  
He also points out that the defendant could have been an 
ongoing danger to his wife since he was still in the house.211  
Additionally, the police did not know what he was going to 
do after they left. 
The facts of Davis, Hammon, and Gonsalves are very 
similar and should have been decided the same way.  In all 
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three cases the police were performing their basic job 
“function” – law enforcement.  Distinguishing between the 
two “functions” of securing a volatile scene or investigating a 
crime impedes the law enforcement procedure, and hinders 
the prosecution of domestic violence crimes.  
 
IX.   USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE CASES 
 
“Battered-woman syndrome” [hereinafter “BWS”] may 
cause a victim to refuse to testify against the abuser or recant 
prior statements made implicating the abuser.  This could 
hinder the prosecution of an abuser post-Davis, if statements 
made by the victim to the responding police officer are not 
allowed into evidence unless the victim testifies at trial.  
However, in order to help the jury to understand the unusual 
behavior of BWS victims, such as refusing to testify at trial, 
many courts allow expert testimony on the subject.212   
BWS is one of many types of a subcategory of post-
traumatic stress disorder.213  It is “a series of common 
characteristics found in women who are abused both 
physically and emotionally by the dominant male figures in 
their lives over a prolonged length of time.”214  Some effects 
of the syndrome are low self-esteem and emotional 
dependence on the abuser.215  The abusive relationship is 
cyclical and consists of three stages: the tension-building 
stage, the violent stage, and the honeymoon stage.216   BWS 
causes the victim to feel responsible for the beatings, thus 
accepting the beatings, but hoping each one is the last.217   
With regard to expert testimony, since the rules of 
evidence vary from state to state, the admission of expert 
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testimony regarding BWS varies depending on what 
jurisdiction the case is in.  Some courts allow the expert to 
testify as to the traits of the “typical” BWS victim generally, 
but others require proof that the victim suffers from BWS.218  
Although expert testimony regarding the symptoms of BWS 
appears helpful to the prosecution, it is not without problems.  
First, it costs money to hire an expert.  In the absence of 
police testimony, the state will have to rely more often on the 
testimony of experts, which becomes cost-prohibitive.  
Second, as previously stated, the rules regarding admission of 
expert testimony are not consistent since the rules of evidence 
vary among jurisdictions.  For example, Ohio only allows the 
introduction of evidence of BWS when the victim is a 
defendant claiming self-defense.219  Other issues that have 
caused concern are relevance of the evidence, prejudicial 
impact of the evidence, and that the evidence shows “the 
defendant’s propensity to be a batterer.”220  Since domestic 
violence is a nation-wide public safety concern, it requires a 
consistent solution.  BWS is a medically recognized 
condition, so there is no reason why a victim should be able 
to introduce evidence of BWS in one state, but not in another 
state.   
For example, a New York court determined that the 
probative value of an expert’s testimony on BWS outweighed 
the possibility of unfair prejudice to the defendant.221  The 
trial court admitted the expert testimony because it was 
offered only in order to help the jury understand why the 
victim recanted her previous accusation against the defendant 
during her grand jury testimony.222  On the other hand, the 
Ohio Appeals Court reversed a conviction for domestic 
violence on the grounds that the danger of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant outweighed the probative value of the expert 
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testimony.223  In the Ohio case, the testimony was only being 
offered to explain why the victim would return home if the 
defendant had really beaten her.224  Comparing these two 
cases, it seems that if the Ohio defendant had beaten his 
victim in New York, his conviction would not have been 
overturned.            
Although costly, prosecutors will have to rely more on 
experts in the wake of the Davis decision.  One solution to 
cure the inconsistencies of admitting expert testimony is to 
create a special rule for experts testifying in domestic 
violence cases in the Federal Rules of Evidence.  This would 
not guarantee consistency but it will help since most states’ 
rules are similar to the Federal Rules.  The rule should state 
that when there is a question of domestic violence, expert 
testimony as to the general character traits of BWS victims 
should be allowed into evidence so long as the expert does 
not diagnose the victim, and the testimony does not show the 
propensity of the defendant to be a batterer.  A special rule 
for experts testifying in domestic violence cases would be 
particularly helpful post-Davis. 
 
X.        FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING 
 
In Davis, the Court suggested using the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing hearsay exception225 instead of the excited 
utterance or present sense impression hearsay exceptions.  
However, the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception is not 
helpful because it adds a step to the prosecution of the 
defendant.  Under this hearsay exception, a defendant who 
causes the absence of a witness by means of wrongdoing 
gives up his right to confront that witness.226  In that instance, 
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the out-of-court statements would likely be allowed into 
evidence.227  The Court did not give an opinion as to the 
standard required to prove forfeiture except to say, under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, the government has to prove 
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.228  
However, if a victim is under duress from the defendant not 
to testify at trial, it is unlikely that she would admit to 
prosecutors that the duress is the reason she refuses to testify.  
This would make it hard for prosecutors to prove forfeiture 
by wrongdoing because they would not have any evidence of 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant.  Using the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing exception, the government would have to first 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant 
caused the victim’s unavailability in order to get the 
statement admitted into evidence, and then at trial, prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime.  Adding an extra step to the legal process is not a good 
solution.  In addition, BWS often causes the victim to refuse 
to testify on her own initiative, without any wrongdoing on 
the part of the defendant.229   
Under these circumstances, the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception would be of no help.  The statements are hearsay 
whether they are allowed in evidence under the excited 
utterance exception, the present sense impression exception, 
or the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception.   Switching to the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception will still allow the same 
statements into evidence, but make it harder to prosecute the 
abuser because of the added step of proving wrongdoing.  
This could leave the abuser free to abuse the victim again. 
 
XI.        CONCLUSION 
  
The extension of the Confrontation Clause is 
unwarranted, outweighed by the need for effective law 
enforcement, and cost-prohibitive if the use of expert 
testimony increases.  However, lower courts are bound by the 
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Davis decision until a more sympathetic case changes the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s mind.   
A fact pattern that may cause the U.S. Supreme Court to 
reconsider its holding in Davis might be this: A state is 
unable to prosecute an abuser because the victim refuses to 
testify at the defendant’s trial.  The victim identified the 
abuser to the police upon their arrival at the scene, but the 
statements were not allowed into evidence because they were 
testimonial under Davis. Therefore, the defendant is not 
prosecuted or is acquitted because the state cannot meet its 
burden of proof.  The victim returns to the abuser either 
because she believes his false promises that he is sorry and 
will not abuse her anymore, or because she has nowhere else 
to go.  As projected, another cycle of abuse begins; one of 
two things may occur: The abuser beats the victim to death or 
the victim kills the abuser in self-defense. Although 
unfortunate and extreme, murder may be necessary before the 
current law changes.  Under the prior Roberts “indicia of 
reliability” test, the hearsay statements made by the victim 
would have been allowed into evidence and a death may have 
been prevented.   
“There is virtually no evidence of what the drafters of the 
Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.”230  Nevertheless, 
it most likely was not intended as an escape hatch for 
criminals to use in order to avoid prosecution.  That is what 
could happen if the Davis decision is upheld. 
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